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1 
Washington University 
Journal of Law & Policy 
The Corporate Conception of the State and the Origins 
of Limited Constitutional Government 
Eric Enlow* 
The word “corporations” in its largest sense has a more 
extensive meaning than people generally are aware of. Any 
body politic (sole or aggregate) whether its power be restricted 
or transcendent, is in this sense “a corporation.” . . . [N]ot only 
each State singly, but even the United States may without 
impropriety be termed “corporations.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article discusses the corporate conception of the state in 
European and American legal history. The corporation as a legal idea 
was instrumental in the development of modern public law. In 
medieval and early modern history, the application of corporate law 
principles to the state contributed to the development of 
constitutionalism and to the idea of popular sovereignty. 2 This Article 
traces a small part of this history in the common law of England and 
in the broader European canon law. The purpose of this historical 
review is to provide a background for understanding similar 
corporate views of the state in early American legal history—views 
which are central to the original understanding of limited 
 
 * Associate, Blackwell Sanders Peper Martin, LLC.  
 1. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 447 (1793) (emphasis in original). 
 2. BRIAN T IERNEY,  RELIGION, LAW AND THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 
82-84 (1982).  
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government. As Justice Iredell’s quotation suggests, the corporate 
conception of the state was not limited to European jurisprudence, 
but had real currency in American jurisprudence as well. 
The conception of the state as a corporation has historically been 
associated with the major goal of constitutionalism: the limitation of 
governmental power by the law.3 In England, lawyers and 
parliamentarians classified the king as a legal corporation in order to 
provide principled, legal limitations to his powers. Because the king 
in his political capacity existed solely as the head of a legal 
corporation, whig lawyers argued that the king acted ultra vires when 
transgressing the incorporating law of the kingdom. 4 
Similarly, in the canon law, corporate law principles established 
limitations on papal authority. By classifying the church as a 
corporation, the canonists found a locus of authority that was 
preexisting and superior to the papal hierarchy. Canonists used this 
theory to explain how an act of the corporate whole might limit or 
override papal authority. The work of these canonists inspired the 
works of secular political theorists like John Locke. These theorists 
adopted the concepts of corporate theory and articulated analogous 
theories of popular rights and sovereignty to impose limitations on 
secular governments.5 
In sum, corporate law analogies have historically provided two 
ways of conceiving limits on government. First, in the common law 
context, corporate principles expressed the purely legal nature of the 
king’s political office and its consequential subordination to law. 
Second, in the canon law or popular sovereignty tradition, corporate 
analogies enabled political theorists to postulate a legal authority in 
the people themselves, independent of the government. Parts II and 
IV of this Article trace the history of these respective lines of 
corporate analogy in the common and canon law. Following each, 
Parts III and V examine evidence of the awareness and use of these 
analogies in American jurisprudence. Part VI of this Article considers 
 
 3. See CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN,  CONSTITUTIONALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN 
(rev. ed. 1947). “[C]onstitutionalism has one essential quality: it is a legal limitation on 
government . . . [T]he most lasting of the essentials of true constitutionalism still remains what 
it has been almost from the beginning, the limitation of government by law.” Id. at 21-22. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See infra Part IV. 
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how modern constitutional interpretation and jurisprudence can use 
these background ideas of the corporate state. 
II. THE CORPORATION AT COMMON-LAW: ORIGINS OF THE STATE AS 
CORPORATION 
One need not dig very deeply into Blackstone’s Commentaries to 
find a connection made between the corporation and the state. 
Blackstone notes that there are two types of legal persons at common 
law—natural and artificial.6 Artificial persons are referred to 
equivocally as “bodies politic, bodies corporate, (corpora corporata ) 
or corporations . . . .”7 Blackstone classifies everything from the 
kingdom to groups chartered “for the advancement . . . [of] 
commerce” as “corporations” exemplifying “political constitutions.”8 
Whatever the ends of the particular corporation, all are “bodies 
politic . . . created and devised by human laws for the purpose of 
society and government.”9 
Blackstone also teaches that the king exemplifies both types of 
legal personhood. He is both a natural person as a man and yet also a 
corporate person, as head of the body politic of the kingdom. 10 Before 
Blackstone, Dr. John Cowell’s Interpreter, the seventeenth-century 
dictionary of legal terms, stated plainly that the king “is a 
Corporation in himself . . . .”11 However, the sixteenth-century case 
of William v. Berkley expounded the same view a century earlier: 
The king has two capacities, for he has two bodies, the one 
whereof is a body natural . . . . [T]he other is a body politic, 
and the members thereof are his subjects, and he and his 
subjects together compose the corporation, as Southcote said, 
and he is incorporated with them and they with him, and he is 
the head and they are the members . . . .12 
 
 6. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *455. 
 7. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 8. Id. at *459. 
 9. Id. at *455. 
 10. Id. at *457. 
 11. JOHN COWELL, THE INTERPRETER OR BOOK CONTAINING THE SIGNIFICATION OF 
WORDS (1607) s.v. “King (Rex).”  
 12. Willion v. Berkley (1559), cited in  Frederick Maitland, The Crown as Corporation, 17 
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The view expressed in William was not itself an innovation. 
Frederick Maitland, the common-law historian, believed that this 
doctrine emanated directly from the legal understanding of the nation 
in the middle ages: 
Medieval thought conceived the nation as a community and 
pictured it as a body of which the king was the head. It 
resembled those smaller bodies which it comprised and of 
which it was in some sort composed. What we should regard as 
the contrast between State and Corporation was hardly visible. 
The “commune of the realm” differed rather in size and power 
than in essence from the commune of the county or the 
commune of a borough.13 
Indeed, the idea that the king is related to kingdom as the head to 
members predates the middle ages.14 Seneca addressed Nero in the 
same terms: “You are the soul of the republic and the republic is your 
body.”15 In Nero’s Rome, the political reality was that the head of the 
Republic absorbed all public rights and little control was left to the 
members. In England, however, the corporate conception of the state 
provided a more powerful legal method for restraining the powers of 
the king. 
Historically, the legal treatment of the king as both a corporation 
of the kingdom and as a natural person exemplified the ongoing 
conflict in England between the republican idea that the king derived 
his power from the people and the monarchical doctrine that 
sovereign power inhered in his natural person. 16 In the sixteenth 
century, when the sovereign power of the king as a person was 
ascendent, courts employed great logical feats to reconcile and equate 
 
LAW Q. REV. 131, 134-35 (1901). 
 13. Maitland, supra  note 12, at 132-33. 
 14. The comparison of the state to a human body originated in ancient Greece and became 
a medieval commonplace. See 2 SIR PAUL VINOGRADOFF,  OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE 12 (1922); ERNST KANTOROWICZ, THE KINGS TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN 
MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1957). For an example of the idea in seventeenth-century 
England, see EDWARD FORSET, A COMPARATIVE DISCOURSE OF THE BODIES NATURAL AND 
POLITIQUE (London, 1606). 
 15. SENECA , DE CLEMENTIA 1.5.1 (“tu animus rei publicae tuae es, illa corpus tuum”).  
 16. Liam Seamus O’Melinn, Note, The American Revolution and Constitutionalism in the 
Seventeenth -Century West Indies, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 104, 118-19 (1995).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/2
p 1 Enlow.doc  2/28/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001]  Corporate Conception of the State 5 
 
 
the king’s personal rights with his corporate rights as head of the 
kingdom. Thus, in the Case of the Duchy of Lancaster, decided 
during Elizabeth’s reign, the court struggled to maintain the identity 
of the king’s personal and corporate capacities: 
[T]he [king] has a body natural adorned and invested with the 
estate and dignity royal, and he has not a body natural distinct 
and divided by itself from the office and dignity royal, but a 
body natural and a body politic together indivisible, and these 
two bodies are incorporated in one person and make one body 
and not divers, that is, the body corporate in the body natural et 
e contra the body natural in the body corporate. So that the 
body natural by the conjunction of the body politic to it (which 
body politic contains the office, government and majesty 
royal) is magnified and by the said consolidation hath in it the 
body politic.17 
The effort to equate the king’s personal rights with his rights as 
officer of the corporation of the realm was an effort to identify the 
state as a whole with the king as an individual, excluding the 
Parliament, the courts, and the people. It would not be long before a 
similar effort succeeded in the transformation of the French 
monarchy into the “moi-narchy” of Louis XIV. 
During the reign of Louis XIV, it was perhaps true that the state 
was embodied in the king in his personal capacity. By Blackstone’s 
day, however, the effort to identify the king’s personal capacity and 
his corporate capacity as head of the kingdom had dissipated. Thus, 
Blackstone taught that the king is only head of the kingdom in his 
corporate capacity: 
The constituent parts of a parliament are the next objects of our 
enquiry. And these are, the king’s majesty, sitting there in his 
royal political capacity, and the three estates of the realm; the 
lords spiritual, the lords temporal, (who sit, together with the 
king, in one house) and the commons, who sit by themselves in 
another. And the king and these three estates, together, form  
 
 17. Case of the Duchy of Lancaster (1561), cited in  Maitland, supra note 12, at 134. 
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the great corporation or body politic of the kingdom, of which 
the king is said to be caput, principium, et finis.18 
By maintaining the separation between the king’s capacity as head 
of the corporation of the kingdom and his private capacity, England 
avoided the personal absolutism of France. For us, Blackstone 
proceeded to demonstrate, the king, lords, and commons possessed 
total sovereign power only when acting together as a single 
corporation.19 Anticipating our Framers, Blackstone explained that 
the union of all powers in either the king or any of the estates “would 
be productive of tyranny.”20 “For preserving the balance of the 
constitution,” the respective powers of legislature and executive were 
separated.21 Only when the officers of the kingdom coordinated their 
powers according to the principles of the corporation could they 
change the law.22 
Blackstone’s analysis was not novel. King Henry VIII recognized 
this principle and he differentiated his individual power from his 
power as head of the corporation of the kingdom: “We be informed 
by our judges that we at no time stand so highly in our estate royal as 
in the time of Parliament, wherein we as head and you as members 
are conjoined and knit together in one body politic.”23 In other words, 
the corporate principles of the kingdom limited the king’s powers. 
When the king acted as head of the corporation of the kingdom in 
agreement with parliament, he acted with greater authority than he 
possessed merely as the chief executive officer thereof. 
John Fortescue, a prominent parliamentarian and judge, expressed 
similar views in his fifteenth-century work On the Merits of the Laws 
of England.24 Fortescue argued that a king who rules a people 
“politically” must be subservient to the law.25 A king who rules 
 
 18. BLACKSTONE, supra  note 6, at *149. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at *150. 
 23. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 14, at 228 (quoting Henry VIII). 
 24. Sir John Fortescue, On the Merits of the Laws of England, IX-XIII, in MEDIEVAL 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 518-21 (S.B. Chrimes trans., Ralph Lerner & Muhsin Mahdi eds., 
1963). Sir John Fortescue, c. 1395-c. 1477, served several times as a member of Parliament and 
was appointed Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in 1422.  
 25. Id. at 518-21. 
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politically cannot violate the fundamental law “of the corporate body 
politic” because those laws constitute that body politic, of which he is 
a mere officer: 
[A] people is a body of men united by consent of law and by 
community of interest . . .. The law by which a group of men is 
made into a people, resembles the nerves of the body physical, 
for, just as the body is held together by the nerves, so this body 
mystical is bound together and united into one by law . . . and 
just as the head of the body physical is unable to change its 
nerves, or to deny its members the powers belonging to them 
and the nourishment of blood belonging to them, so a king who 
is head of the body politic is unable to change the laws . . . [by 
which a group of men is made into a people].26 
Fortescue argued that the king derived his powers and functions from 
his position in the corporation of the kingdom. Accordingly, he could 
not abrogate the law which incorporates the polity without abrogating 
his own position. 
In his Commentaries, Blackstone discussed another feature of the 
corporate conception of the king. When acting in his political 
capacity as an officer of the kingdom corporate: 
[T]he prerogative of the crown extends not to do any injury: it 
is created for the benefit of the people, and therefore cannot be 
exerted to their prejudice.  
 The king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, 
but even of thinking wrong: he can never mean to do an 
improper thing: in him is no folly or weakness. And therefore, 
if the crown should be induced to grant any franchise or 
privilege to a subject contrary to reason or in any wise 
prejudicial to the commonwealth, or a private person, the law 
will not suppose the king to have meant either an unwise or an 
injurious action . . . .27 
Thus, the king in his corporate capacity was given a legal limitation. 
As with any entity existing in the intendment of the law, he could not 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. BLACKSTONE, supra  note 6, at *239 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
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violate the law. As in corporate law, when the officers of the 
corporation violate its charter or the laws of the corporation, the 
corporation then is not considered to have acted, only the officers in 
their private capacity.28 Similarly, if the king acted illegally in his 
personal capacity, the law would hold that the king in his political 
capacity had not acted at all. 
Or, as the court put it in Willion v. Berkley, during the reign of 
Henry VII:  
[W]hen the Body politic of King of this Realm is conjoined to 
the Body natural, and one Body is made of them both, the 
Degree of the Body natural . . . is thereby altered, and the 
Effects thereof are changed by its Union with the other Body, 
and don’t remain in their former Degree, but partake of the 
Effects of the Body politic  . . . . The Body politic wipes away 
every Imperfection of the other Body . . . .29 
The corporate law doctrine of ultra vires, at least theoretically, 
prevented the king’s personal acts from becoming an act of his 
corporate or political capacity when they violated the laws which 
created his office. The king’s corporate nature when acting in his 
official capacity placed an inherent limit on his capacity to violate the 
fundamental laws of the corporate kingdom. 
As the kings of England sought to centralize their power, they 
naturally resisted the view of themselves as mere officers within a 
legal corporation. As long as the crown was a creation of the law, it 
was subject to legal limitation by courts and by Parliament. As long 
as the king was enmeshed in the corporation of the kingdom, the 
republican ideal of the subjection of the ruler to law and the good of 
the people held sway. As Blackstone observed, if the Crown is 
“created for the benefit of the people . . . [it] cannot be exerted to 
their prejudice.”30 By contrast, if the king ruled by divine right and 
personal authority, as in the Filmerian view, then the king was not a 
 
 28. Being “invisible, and existing only in intendment and consideration of law . . . [a] 
corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime, in it’s corporate capacity: though 
its members may in their distinct individual capacities.” Id. at *464 (internal citations omitted). 
 29. Plowden, Reports 238, quoted in KANTOROWICZ, supra note 14, at 11. 
 30. BLACKSTONE, supra  note 6, at *239. 
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creation of the law by the people, but rather the sovereign source of 
the law.31 
For these reasons, the corporate conception of the state came to a 
head in the Puritan Revolution. Even the ballads of the Cavaliers 
made it clear that they were loyal to a personal rather than a corporate 
king: “Thou art our sovereign still in spite of their hate; Our zeal is to 
thy person, not thy state.”32 While on the other side, the Puritan motto 
elevated the legal King above the person of the king: “We fight the 
king to defend the King.”33 The Puritan war-cry was transformed into 
law by the Declaration of the Lords and Commons of May 27, 1642, 
in which Parliament declared itself to retain the “King’s” corporate 
power even though the “king” himself stood in the field against it.34 
In the events leading to Charles I’s execution in the 1640s, 
Charles himself, in an attempt at reconciliation with Parliament, 
formally declared in 1642 that England was a corporation. 35 Charles’ 
declaration was widely viewed as a concession of his claims to rule 
by personal right.36 Lawyer and parliamentarian William Prynne 
explained Charles’ pronouncement: “Kings, Lords, and Commons, by 
the Common Law, make up but one intire Corporation . . ..”37 Hence, 
 
 31. Sir Robert Filmer, a prominent royalist and Locke’s chosen adversary in the first of 
his Two Treatises,  argued for the personal nature of royal authority by equating kingly and 
paternal authority. Since Adam had been a king by dint of his literally primary paternal right 
and the king’s right descended from this Adamic right, the notion of original popular 
sovereignty was impossible and no place was left “for such imaginary pactions between Kings 
and their people as many dream of.” THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1450-
1700, 358-60 (J.H. Burns & Mark Goldie eds., 1991). 
 32. The mournful ballad’s name is “Upon His Majesty’s Coming to Holmby.” After his 
surrender to the English Commissioners by the Scotch, King Charles was conveyed to Holmby 
House, Northamptonshire, on February 16, 1647.  
 33. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 14, at 18. 
 34. The Declaration read:  
it is acknowledged that the king is the fountain of justice and protection; but the acts of 
justice and protection are not exercised by his own person, nor depend upon his 
pleasure, but by his courts and by his ministers who must do their duty therein though 
the king in his own Person should forbid them. And therefore, if judgement should be 
given by them against the king’s will and personal command, yet are they the king’s 
judgements. 
SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 488 (Carl Stephenson & Frederick George 
Marcham eds., 1937). 
 35. TIERNEY, supra note 2, at 82. 
 36. Id. 
 37. WILLIAM PRYNNE, THE SOVERAIGNE POWER OF PARLIAMENTS AND KINGDOMS I, 41 
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as Prynne argued, although the king was greater than any individual, 
he was less than the two houses of commons and lords: “[they are 
superior to the king] as a Generall Councell is above the Pope, the 
Chapter above the Bishop, the University above the Chancellor.”38 
Prynne’s corporate thinking was realized in its severest form at 
Charles’ trial for high treason and the replacement of his Kingdom 
with a Commonwealth. 
III. THE UNITED STATES AS CORPORATION: A CONTINUATION OF 
THE COMMON-LAW TRADITION 
Prynne’s corporate conception of the government is repeated 
almost verbatim one-hundred and fifty years later in the American 
case Respublica v. Cornelius Sweers.39 The Court heard the appeal of 
a clerk, Sweers, who had been convicted of defrauding the American 
army during the revolutionary war.40 Sweers argued that it was 
impossible for him to have defrauded the government because during 
the Revolutionary War the government was not yet a corporation and 
so lacked any legal personality. 41 In rejecting this argument, the 
Court reasoned that “[f]rom the moment of their association, the 
United States necessarily became a body corporate.”42 To explain the 
necessity of this conclusion, the Court analogized the United States to 
the English government of “the king, lords, and commons” which 
were “certainly a body corporate.”43 The Justices were not only 
familiar with the corporate conception of the state discussed above 
but thought that it would apply “necessarily” to any new American 
government. 
The corporate conception of the United States also played a role at 
the Constitutional Convention in 1787. Madison recorded an 
interesting submission to the Committee of Detail which suggests a 
close link between the corporate conception of the state and the legal 
 
& IV, 153 (London, 1643). 
 38. Id. at IV, 153. 
 39. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 41 (1779). 
 40. Id. at 41-44. 
 41. Id. at 44. 
 42. Id. (alterations and emphasis in original). 
 43. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/2
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limitation of government.44 The proposal, from Mr. Pinckney, 
suggests a whole list of protections from governmental abuse to be 
included in the Constitution: provisions for the writ of Habeas 
Corpus, liberty of the press, limitations on a standing army, 
prohibitions on the quartering of soldiers, prohibitions on any 
individual’s holding of a plurality of offices, and prohibitions on 
religious tests.45 Among these protections, Pinckney includes the 
proposition that “[t]he United States shall be forever considered as 
one body corporate and politic in law”46 as if this provision would 
likewise protect the liberties of the people. The combination of these 
proposals may be merely coincidental. Assuming, however, that the 
propositions bore a common end, Pinckney’s proposition suggests a 
strong connection in the delegate’s mind between the corporate 
conception of the state and the protections of liberty which he 
proposed. 
More evidence of this conception can be found in the debates of 
the Federal Convention. Utilizing a corporate conception of the 
government, Madison argued several times in these debates that the 
term “sovereign” could not truly be applied to any government of 
limited powers: 
We are vague in our language . . .. There is a gradation from a 
simple corporation for limited and specified objects, such as an 
incorporation of a number of Mechanicks up to a full 
sovereignty . . . whose Powers are not limited. The last only 
are truly sovereign. The States, which have not such full 
power, . . . are political associations or corporations, 
possessing certain powers—by these they may make some, but 
not all, Laws.47 
Madison argued that the laws passed by the legislature of a limited 
government stood in the same relation to that government’s 
constitution as a “corporation’s bye laws [sic] to the supreme law 
 
 44. JAMES MADISON,  JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 558-59 (E.H. Scott ed., 
special ed. 1898). 
 45. Id. at 559. 
 46. Id. 
 47. RUFUS KING, 1 NOTES OF RUFUS KING IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF JULY 1787, 
THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING 610 (N.Y. 1894). 
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within a State.”48 Madison explained that the term ‘sovereign’ was 
applicable only to “the largest empire[s].”49 Madison returned to that 
point in another speech, again emphasizing that limited governments 
are “only great corporations, having the power of making by-laws.”50 
Rufus King expressed the same view that limited governments are 
properly considered “corporations . . . and not sovereigns.”51 
Perhaps the most considered treatment of the corporate conception 
of the state in early American jurisprudence can be found in the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of state sovereign immunity in Chisholm 
v. Georgia .52 Five years after the debates of the federal convention, 
the Court encountered a “great cause”—the issue of state sovereign 
immunity. 53 Perhaps surprisingly to the modern mind, four of the five 
Justices deciding the case found corporate law principles relevant to 
the issue of sovereign immunity. Indeed, Justice Iredell, having 
considered the common law rules of sovereign immunity directly, 
noted that besides these “[t]here is no other part of the common law 
. . . which can by any person be pretended in any manner to apply to 
this case, but that which concerns corporations.”54 
Justice Iredell explained the relevance of corporate law to 
understanding the nature of the states: 
The word “corporations,” in its largest sense, has a more 
extensive meaning than people generally are aware of. Any 
body politic (sole or aggregate) whether its power be restricted 
or transcendent, is in this sense “a corporation.” The King, 
accordingly, in England is called a corporation . . .. So also, by 
a very respectable author . . . is the Parliament itself. In this 
 
 48. MADISON, supra note 44, at 297. The comparison of the subordination of legislation to 
the constitution and the subordination of a corporation’s by -laws to the laws of the state may 
not be immediately clear. However, the principle that the private statutes of a corporation 
cannot conflict with the laws of the state was a rule set forth in the Twelve Tables of Ancient 
Rome: “Sodales, legem quam volent, dum nequid ex publica lege corrumpant, sibi ferunto.” 
JAMES WILSON, II THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 270 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896) 
(discussing the principles at length).  
 49. Id. 
 50. ROBERT YATES, SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 117 (1836).   
 51. KING, supra note 47, at 602. 
 52. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 53. Id. at 429. 
 54. Id. at 446. 
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extensive sense, not only each State singly, but even the United 
States may without impropriety be termed “corporations.”55 
Additionally, Justice Iredell pointed out that neither the United 
States nor the individual states are “subordinate corporations.”56 
Rather, both emerged equally from “the same pure and sacred 
source,” the act of the people.57 Justice Iredell considered that all 
corporations are totally dependent on their creating authority from 
which they draw their existence and by whose will their charter may 
be revoked or amended. 58 Likewise, because corporations are entities 
of law, their acts are subject to revision by a court of law.59 
Accordingly, while corporate law properly described the 
constitutionally based dependence of government on the will of the 
people, it did not describe the relation between states and the federal 
government.60 
Justice James Wilson also analyzed the issue of sovereign 
immunity in terms of corporate law. Speaking of states generally, 
Justice Wilson explained their nature in corporate terms: 
By a State I mean, a complete body of free persons united 
together . . . [forming] an artificial person. It has its affairs and 
its interests: It has its rules: It has its rights: And it has its 
obligations. It may acquire property distinct from that of its 
members. It may incur debts to be discharged out of the public 
stock, not out of the private fortunes of individuals.61 
Three years before he wrote his opinion in Chisholm, Justice 
Wilson had explained this position in public lectures on law at the 
College of Philadelphia: 
[I]n a state, smaller societies may be formed by a part of its 
members: that these smaller societies, like states, are deemed 
to be moral persons . . .. To these societies the name of 
 
 55. Id. at 447 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). 
 56. Id. at 447-48. 
 57. Chisolhm , 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 448. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. at 455 (emphasis in original). 
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corporations is generally appropriated, though somewhat 
improperly; for that the term is strictly applicable to supreme 
as well as to inferior bodies politic.62 
Justice Wilson likewise was familiar with the view that “the King 
and these three Estates together form the great corporation or body 
politic of the Kingdom.”63 Like Justice Iredell, he insisted that the 
government of the United States, unlike the King-in-Parliament, did 
not form the great corporation of the nation; the people did. In 
relation to the “body of the people,” both the United States and the 
individua l states remained subordinate corporations.64 
Justice Cushing likewise relied upon corporate theory to explain 
why suits could be allowed against states. Justice Cushing addressed 
arguments that allowing suits against the states would be to treat 
them as mere corporations and hence to rob them of their sovereign 
powers.65 Cushing dismissed the notion that corporate status 
somehow degraded the states: “As to corporations, all States 
whatever are corporations or bodies politic. The only question is, 
what are their powers? As to individual States and the United States, 
the Constitution marks the boundary of powers.”66 
In the light of popular sovereignty, all states could be considered 
as mere corporations. This view transformed the sovereign immunity 
issue from a question of the nature of states to a positive question of 
which rights the people had delegated to which corporations. Because 
of popular sovereignty, Chief Justice Jay considered the question of 
the suability of a state or a corporation to be an identical issue.67 
Because all power was delegated from the people, all corporations, 
whether called states or not, were equally susceptible by nature to suit 
if the people had delegated jurisdiction for such suits.68 That is, the 
consideration of the state as a corporation transformed the question 
from one about the nature of statehood into a legal, positivist question 
 
 62. WILSON, supra  note 48, at 265. 
 63. Chisolhm , 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 462 (emphasis in original). 
 64. Id. at 456. 
 65. Id. at 468. 
 66. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 67. Id. at 472. 
 68. Id.  
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about the construction of the Constitution. 
These views were echoed in later cases. In 1823 Chief Justice 
Marshall noted: “The United States is a government, and, 
consequently, a body politic and corporate, capable of attaining the 
objects for which it was created . . .. This great corporation was 
ordained and established by the American people . . .. Its powers are 
unquestionably limited . . ..”69 
In 1850 the Supreme Court noted that the general capacities and 
powers of corporations, like making contracts and holding property, 
had to be attributed to the United States because “[e]very sovereign 
State is of necessity a body politic, or artificial person . . ..”70 In 1885, 
the Court noted that because a state is a corporation—“an ideal 
person, intangible, invisible, immutable”—it followed that a state can 
“act only by law, whatever it does say and do must be lawful.”71 
Indeed, the court called this corporate conception of the state 
“essential to the idea of constitutional government.”72 The court 
reasoned that because a “state is a political corporate body, [it] can 
act only through agents, and can command only by laws.”73 The 
corporate nature of the state rendered it an entity of law and, hence, 
subject to the law. 
One reason the corporate conception of the state may have been so 
attractive is the common law principle that corporations are the 
recipients of delegated powers of the sovereign. This comports well 
with the Federalist idea that the people delegated the powers of the 
individual states to the United States. For example, Kent in his 
Commentaries defined the common law corporation, both private and 
municipal, precisely as a political association to which the sovereign 
has delegated a part of its power.74 
In American history, the idea that corporations received a 
delegation of part of the sovereign’s authority was politically 
important and well known. Several of the American colonies were 
 
 69. United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (Marshall, C.J.). 
 70. Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229, 231 (1850). 
 71. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 290 (1884). 
 72. Id. at 291. 
 73. Id. at 288. 
 74. JAMES KENT,  COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 267 (New York, O. Halstad, 2d 
ed. 1832). 
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established as corporations. Accordingly, the colonists’ legal 
arguments against Parliamentary jurisdiction over internal colonial 
matters rested on the belief that Parliament’s sovereign authority over 
these matters had been delegated to the colonies in their corporate 
charters.75 
This understanding of the corporation remained strong in America 
after its independence. Popular opposition to corporations in the first 
fifty years of American history rested largely on the principle that 
“whatever power is given to a corporation, is just so much power 
taken from the State, in derogation of the original power of the mass 
of the community.”76 Indeed, the idea that corporations exercised 
sovereign powers was so familiar to the American people that 
newspaper editorials opposed the incorporation of the national bank 
as threatening “that solecism in politics, a government within a 
government.”77 Public officials similarly warned their constituents 
that “government, unsparingly and with an unguarded hand, shall 
multiply corporations . . . until only the very shadow of sovereignty 
remains.”78 The notion that all corporations were vested with 
delegated sovereign rights was taken seriously, even in popular 
circles. 
Thinking along these lines, some nineteenth-century legal treatises 
associated American federalism not only with the constitutionally 
protected rights of the individual states, but with all corporations. As 
the jurist Francis Lieber explained, “[a] corporation is a political or 
civil institution . . . conducted according to the laws of its 
constitution.”79 He further explained that “[a]ll the American 
governments are corporations created by charters, viz. their 
constitutions . . ..”80 Subordinate corporations—those created by the 
individual states—were viewed as an extension of American 
federalism into day-to-day life so that “[t]he whole political system is 
 
 75. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
189-91, 201, 221 (1992). 
 76. Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation , 50 WM. & 
MARY Q., 3d Series 51, 68 (1993). 
 77. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 78. Id. at 68-69 (internal citations omitted). 
 79. FRANCIS LIEBER, 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA AMERICANA 547 (1830).  
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made up of a concatenation of various corporations, political, civil, 
religious, social and economical,” in which the nation itself was a 
“great corporation, comprehending all others.”81 
Similarly, in a nineteenth-century American treatise on private 
corporations, the authors, having already emphasized the common 
nature of state and corporation, discussed the historical role of 
corporations as antecedents of American federalism: 
Nations, or States, are denominated by publicists bodies 
politic; and are said to have their affairs and interests, and to 
deliberate and resolve in common. They thus become as moral 
persons, having an understanding and will peculiar to 
themselves, and are susceptible of obligations and laws. In this 
extensive sense, the United States may be termed a 
corporation; they are a collective invisible body, which can act 
and be seen only in the acts of those who administer the affairs 
of the government . . .. It may be so said of each State singly. 
So the king of England is a corporation; and so is parliament.82 
Similarly, in another nineteenth-century treatise, the author notes 
that “[corporations] are simply the administrative form of the 
fundamental American idea of government, viz., that the people are 
the source of all political power and have the right to exercise it.”83 
In the author’s view, corporations allowed the delegation of 
governmental authority away from the center to ever-smaller political 
communities, more adapted to self-rule and more protective of the 
people’s liberty.84 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. JOSEPH K. ANGELL &  SAMUAL AMES,  TREATISE ON T HE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 10-11 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 5th ed. 1855) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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(5th ed. 1911) (emphasis in original). 
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IV. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE: A SECOND STRAND OF 
CORPORATE THEORY 
As we have discussed, the legal conception of the state as a 
corporation was not only present at common law but continued into 
early American jurisprudence. The application of corporate theory to 
the state occurred not just in the common law, but also in the wider 
canon law governing the Roman Catholic Church in Europe. An 
understanding of the canon laws application of corporate law to 
politics is ultimately necessary to make sense of the relationship 
between the corporation and state in American jurisprudence. The 
idea of popular sovereignty first emerged from canon law.85 
By the twelfth century, the Roman Catholic church was conceived 
in legal terms as a corporation by European civilians and canonists.86 
As a matter of canon law, all Christians were incorporated into the 
one Body of Christ. During the twelfth century, it became usual to 
describe the Church itself as a “mystical body.”87 This corporation 
was considered a real person: a substantia , a species, a natura, and 
possessing its own instinctum. 88 As early as 1250, civilians, secular 
lawyers of the civil law tradition, borrowed this terminology from the 
canonist to describe the state as a “corpus republicae mysticum, 
‘mystical body of the commonweal.’”89 By the fourteenth century, as 
we have discussed above, English judges were already applying these 
borrowed ideas of canon law in England, laying the groundwork for 
 
 85. JOSEPH P. CANNING, I THE CORPORATION IN THE THOUGHT OF THE ITALIAN JURISTS, 
HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 9, 31 (1980). The medieval canonists: 
combined the ultimately Aristotelian conception of the people composed of natural, 
political men, with juristic corporational concepts, thus adding juristic refinement to 
the idea of the people as a political entity. The result .  . . produced a conception of the 
city populus that had not been enuciated before, namely that it is a collection of 
natural, political men into a unitary entity which is an abstract and immortal legal 
person . . . both self-governing and territorial.  
Id. 
 86. Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Corporate Idea and the Body Politic in the Middle 
Ages, in 9 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS 423-52 (1947); MICHAEL WILKS, THE PROBLEM OF 
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 19 (1963). 
 87. See Chroust, supra note 86; WILKS, supra note 86, at 19. 
 88. ANTONY BLACK,  COUNCIL AND COMMUNE: THE CONCILIAR MOVEMENT AND THE 
FIFTEENTH -CENTURY HERITAGE 58 (1979). 
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the conversion of the king’s personal right of dominion into a right 
delegated to an officer of the corporation of the realm. 
For the contemporary ear, the analogy made by the English judges 
between the legal nature of the state and the legal nature of the 
Church sounds strained. In point of fact, the Church was legally more 
state-like than the states of that era. The political alliances of the 
feudal middle ages were personal; the medieval lord governed 
through his personal feudal attachments.90 Meanwhile, the Church 
had already developed the idea of sovereignty: an idea of a legal 
community governed by a public office. As John Neville Figgis, the 
great historian of constitutionalism, observed: 
[I]n the Middle Ages the omnipotent territorial State, treated as 
a person and the coequal of other states, was non-existent . . . . 
It has been said that there is no Austinian [absolute] sovereign 
in the medieval State. This is true of the individual kingdoms. 
This is not true of the Church.91 
The development of the modern state depended on learning from 
the Church.  
[I]n the Latin West, the Church had the first organized 
hierarchy of courts with positive written laws, standardized 
pleadings, and regular channels of appeal . . . the first 
rationalized system of tax collection and disbursement . . . it 
was inevitable that the medieval Church should . . . 
recapitulate in advance the development of the modern state.92 
This recapitulation occurred. The Church first developed theories of 
the absolute sovereignty of the Pope in matters of Church polity. 
Then, discovering the difficulties of a legally unrestrained 
“monarch,” Church canonists developed a theory of 
constitutionalism. 93 In their efforts to formulate legal limits on papal 
sovereignty, they developed Roman principles of corporate law into a 
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 91. JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, STUDIES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM GERSON TO GROTIUS: 
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new vision of the papacy as a mere legal office of the Church’s body 
politic.94 
The rise of popular sovereignty as a political doctrine was 
prefigured and informed by the events of the Conciliar movement in 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centur ies. The Conciliar movement 
attempted to use general councils to limit papal control over the 
Church.95 The movement responded both to the growing 
centralization of papal authority and to the abuses of power by the 
papacy in exile in Avignon.96 The conciliarists provided the legal 
framework necessary to articulate a fundamental idea of popular 
sovereignty based on the principle that the Church was a corporation. 
Prefiguring Prynne’s arguments against Charles I, conciliarists 
argued that the corporate body of the Church was superior to its head 
officer because the corporate body is the source of the officer’s 
power.97 
Legal arguments about the rights of the councils qua 
representatives of the corporate body of Christians, versus the Pope, 
began with two principles from Justinian’s Digest: “Laws themselves 
are binding because the people accept them,” and “[w]hat has pleased 
the Prince has the force of law since the people conferred all its 
imperium and power on him.”98 The conciliarist jurists argued that 
these legal principles could only be reconciled if the people conceded 
power without transferring it and, consequently, fundamentally 
alienated it from themselves.99 In any other case, only one of the 
propositions could be true. If the people had truly alienated 
sovereignty from themselves, then laws promulgated by the ruler, 
political or religious, were not contingent on the people’s acceptance 
of them. However, if the people merely delegated the authority to the 
 
 94. See infra  notes 95-101. 
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ruler, then it would still be true that the ruler or government issued 
laws at its will while recognizing the people’s right to revoke or limit 
that power. 
Still, the conciliarists faced a contradiction: “How, as all admitted, 
could the Pope be set above the church as the governor of Her and yet 
be subordinate to the people whom he ruled as head?” Corporate 
theory provided the answer. The Church—the people—command as 
a corporation; they obey the Pope as individuals.100 The jurists noted 
that the ruler—the government—of a corporation “does not have 
more power than the whole people but than each individual of the 
people.”101 Thus, the conciliarists were able to reconcile the Pope’s 
claim to supremacy over any individual within the Church and yet 
recognize the rights of the individuals of the Church. These 
individuals, in their character as a corporate entity, disciplined the 
Pope and passed fundamental canon laws that he could not disobey. 
During the Great Schism, when there were three contending 
popes, specifying the relation between the authority of the Church-
corporate and its head officer, the Pope, became an essential legal 
matter for the Church.102 In 1408, Cardinal Zabarella held that, like 
any corporation, “the [chief officer] has plenitude of power not as an 
individual but as head of the corporation so that the power is in the 
corporate whole as its foundation and in the pope as the principal 
minister through whom it is exercised.”103 In 1415, the Council of 
Constance claimed supreme authority to represent the corporate body 
of Christians.104 The council removed all three contending popes and 
elected a new one. Similar views were expressed at the Council of 
Basle in the 1430s: “the power of the people is greater than the power 
of their rulers . . . because they could not alienate jurisdiction from 
themselves.”105 
During roughly the same period, Italian civilian jurists formulated 
the legal doctrines of the independent city-republics of northern and 
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central Italy. The theory of a sovereign, self-governing people 
emerged there on the foundation of canon laws developed in the 
Conciliarist movement.106 Following the canonists’ description of the 
Church as the corpus mysticum Dei, the commentator Baldus, for 
example, described the people as a corpus mysticum.107 Moreover, 
Baldus argued that the nature of the corporation of the people was not 
derived from or artificially created by the state. In his account, there 
is no externally appointed administrator of the people’s rights. 
Rather, the corporation of the people came into being through the 
election of representatives who, in assembly, created the governing 
council of the city. This election transformed individuals into a 
corporate legal person by unifying the will and mind of the people. 
Baldus also made clear that officers who were elected to the council 
of the people derived their authority from the will of the people, to 
whom they are inferiores.108 
As our earlier discussion of their role in England showed, the 
ideas of the Conciliarists and canonists like Baldus did not fade into 
obscurity. They expressed theories of a limited monarchy and popular 
rights in ways that enabled them to become classical. Additionally, 
through the universities, their teachings passed to civilian jurists who 
were commonly educated both in canon and common law. Their 
elaboration of corporate law inspired a shift in the understanding of 
government from principles of personal lordship to principles of legal 
association. When the canonists began to write, the principles of 
republican government and popular consent as the sources of 
governmental legitimacy were virtually unknown. Divine right, the 
right of conquest, or the right of a Filmerian patriarchy grounded the 
king’s right to rule. By the time of the American Revolutionary War, 
respected thinkers such as John Locke had popularized the canonists’ 
theory of popular sovereignty to the point where it became a common 
maxim of our Framers.109 
These modern theorists continued to use the logic of corporate law 
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to explain the sovereignty of the people. Locke, for example, in two 
critical passages used analogies of incorporation to explain the origin 
of government: 
When any number of men have so consented to make one 
community . . . they are thereby presently incorporated, and 
make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act 
and conclude the rest. For when any number of men have, by 
the consent of every individual, made a community, they have 
thereby made that community one body with a power to act as 
one body, which is only by the will and determination of the 
majority.110 
 . . . That which makes the community, and brings men out 
of the loose state of nature, into one politic society, is the 
agreement which every one has with the rest to incorporate 
and act as one body, and so be one distinct commonwealth .111 
This “agreement . . . to incorporate” created a corporate body with 
rights of self-determination. The corporation of the people, in turn, 
acted to create government; that is, no government was required to 
create this corporation, but rather, the people exercised their inherent 
right to incorporate themselves. These corporate ideas, borrowed 
from canon law, are the foundation of the American theory of popular 
sovereignty to which this Article now turns. 
V. THE CORPORATION OF THE PEOPLE IN AMERICA: A 
CONTINUATION OF THE CANON LAW TRADITION 
The view that the people are separate, superior, and antecedent to 
government requires that they be self-incorporating. This idea was 
present in America before the American Revolution. The Pilgrims on 
board the Mayflower announced that even without a state to 
incorporate them they could, in the presence of God and one another, 
covenant and combine to form a “civil body politic.”112 Comparing 
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church and state, the Pilgrims reasoned that just as they had the right 
to form a congregation, they also had the right to form a state: “A 
visible Church under the Gospel [is] as spiritual body politike . . . 
[formed] by a free mutuall consent of Believers joynning and 
covenanting to live as members of a society . . . by such consent . . . 
all Civill perfect Corporations [i.e. states] did first beginne.”113 
Following the Pilgrims’ example, in 1647 the colonists of Rhode 
Island erected themselves into a corporation by their own act: “Wee 
do jointly agree to incorporate ourselves and soe to remain a Body 
politicke . . . and do declare to own ourselves and one another to be 
Members of the same body, and to have right to the Freedom and 
priviliges thereof.”114 Thus, the precedent was established that the 
corporation of the people is created not by act of the state but by the 
self-acting power of properly assembled individuals giving 
themselves a corporate capacity. Likewise, after the American 
Revolution, the leaders of New Hampshire urged all towns “forthwith 
[to] incorporate themselves” so that in the absence of Crown 
authority “the people” might not slip into anarchy but “ma[k]e a 
stand at the first legal stage, viz. their town incorporations.”115 
A decisive moment in American constitutionalism came when the 
former colonists decided that the people, acting through their own 
initiative by convention, outside of an established legislature, could 
form “a body corporate and politic in name and fact.”116 The contract 
principles based on an agreement between ruler and those ruled 
served the English Constitution in Magna Charta but could not 
provide a foundation for the creation of the “American People.”117 No 
government yet existed. As Thomas Paine stated: “To suppose that 
any government can be a party in a compact with the whole people, is 
to suppose it to have existence before it can have a right to exist.”118 
Instead, the people had to incorporate before they could take steps 
towards forming the new government. 
Accordingly, early American minds fastened on the corporatist 
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ideas of John Locke, who advocated replacing a contract between 
ruler and those ruled with the idea of the people as a self-
incorporating entity.119 This self-formation of the people as a 
corporation “seemed to make sense of their rapidly developing idea 
of a constitution as a fundamental law designed by the people to be 
separate from and controlling of all the institutions of 
government.”120 Moving the fundamental source of authority from 
the government to the people allowed the development of a law that 
would be superior to government and thus capable of limiting 
government. 
Popular sovereignty, the idea of a self-incorporating and pre-
existing group that itself created the government, reflects one 
influence of corporate theory on the United States Constitution. 
However, the United States of America is definitively not the 
American people. Indeed, as Hamilton put it, “[t]he true distinction 
[of the American government] . . . lies in the total exclusion of the 
people, in their collective capacity, from any share” in the 
government.121 Hamilton obviously did not mean that the 
Constitution excluded popular participation in elections, because the 
Constitution requires the election of representatives by the people.122 
Rather, Hamilton meant that the entity, the United States, is not 
identified with the people. Instead, the United States is constituted as 
an inferior and artificial body, fully separate, distinct, and derivative 
from the corporation of the People. 
Unlike England, where the corporation of the king-in-parliament 
came to be equated with the people, the American people stand above 
and separate from the corporation which is the government. As John 
Taylor wrote in 1814: in the English Constitution, “the nation and the 
government is considered as one, and the passive obedience denied to 
the king [ended up] conceded to the government . . . ; whereas, by 
ours, the people and the government are considered as distinct.”123 In 
Taylor’s analysis, the English Constitution did not fail because it 
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lacked the principle of representative government. Quite the opposite; 
the doctrine of the unlimitable power of the government had emerged 
because the English government was itself treated as the 
representative equivalent of all society. Therefore, its downfall was 
not due to the English rejection of popular sovereignty, but to an 
inability to conceive the government as separate from the people. 
The Framers of the United States Constitution rejected the view 
that the corporation of the government encompasses or represents the 
corporation of the people. As Thomas Tudor Tucker wrote in 1784: 
“It is a vain and weak argument . . . that, the legislature being the 
representatives of the people, the act of the former is therefore always 
to be considered as the act of the latter. They are the representatives 
of the people for certain purposes only, not to all intents and purposes 
whatever.”124 Rather, Tucker concluded that the corporation of the 
people encompassed the corporation of the government: “who have 
we in America but the people? Members of congress, of assemblies, 
or councils are still a part of the people. Their honours do not take 
them out of the aggregate body.”125 
The particular powers of the United States Congress were not 
derived from its identity with the people, like Parliament’s powers, 
but delegated according to its charter from the people. Thus, America 
transformed the doctrine of popular sovereignty from one that 
delivered omnipotence to the government to one that restrained the 
government. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this Article is to provide a historical background 
within which a corporate conception of the United States could be 
considered. There are two separate dimensions to this history and the 
difference between them is important. Common law conceives of the 
government as a legal corporation and places it thereby firmly under 
the law. The canon law, by contrast, conceives of the people as a self-
incorporating body and, thereby, treats the people as an entity 
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antecedent and superior to government. These two corporate 
conceptions combine in the United States Constitution to create a 
government twice limited, once by its own merely legal nature and 
once by the people’s prior existence. 
The combination of both in American constitutional history is 
problematic. As a matter of logic, if the corporation of the people can 
be conceived of as natural and self-creating, then why suppose that 
the corporation of the government is any less so? On the other hand, 
the fact that the Framers treated the people as a natural corporation 
and the government as an artificial legal corporation is surely 
significant, even if not a logical necessity. In fact, precisely because 
the differentiation is not a requirement of logic, it emphasizes the 
deliberate nature of the Framers’ choice. To maintain the Framers’ 
vision, the government’s artificial legal existence must always be 
distinguished from the people’s real and natural existence. 
As a principle of law, it is not obvious what direct application the 
consideration of the United States government as a legal corporation 
might have. Although the Justices in Chisholm found it workable, a 
corporate view of the government is a better principle of 
interpretation than a source of substantive law. A principled 
application of constitutional law is impossible without a background 
understanding of the legal nature of the government which the 
Constitution creates. If constitutional interpretation is to be 
principled, one of the core principles upon which it is based should 
be derived from the nature of government which the Constitution 
creates. In this case, the conception of the government as a legal 
corporation emphasizes the susceptibility of the government to legal 
limitation. This ground alone recommends it to any society which 
values the rule of law. 
Similarly, the conception of the people as a corporation renders a 
great service if only in reminding us that the government is not 
ultimate, natural, or instituted for any purpose beyond the needs of 
the people. The corporate conception of the people also offers a 
foundation for working out a less individualistic account of the rights 
reserved to the people. The corporate conception of the people 
suggests that not all rights protected from government interference 
need be vested in individuals. The peoples, both of the United States 
and of the individual states, as corporations, constitute alternative 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1 Enlow.doc  2/28/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 6:1 
 
 
bearers of rights whose legal claims should be protected as well. 
Most broadly, the corporate conceptions of government and 
people provides an alternative to the dichotomous view of state and 
individual. The important role which corporate theory played in the 
development of constitutionalism warns against trying to understand 
our polity solely in terms of the individual and the sovereign. In place 
of the sovereign’s power, corporate theory offers an idea of a legal 
association. In place of individual isolation, the corporation offers an 
additional group existence which mediates between the individual 
and the government. The reduction of the people to a mere 
aggregation of individuals, like the elevation of the government to a 
position of extra-legal sovereignty, tears at the corporate conceptions 
which are basic to our constitutional tradition. 
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